TROUBLE ON THE HORIZON: SOUTHERN AFRICA’S SECURITY SQUEEZE

13 Feb 2026

Southern Africa’s political and security crises are no longer isolated problems. They are merging into a regional risk environment that is steadily raising costs for trade, investment, and logistics.

A recently released (Feb 26) Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA) report entitled “Trouble on the Horizon”, argues that Mozambique’s fragile political order, the entrenched insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Zimbabwe’s institutional decay, and South Africa’s declining defence capability now reinforce one another.

The result is a cross-border system of instability with direct commercial consequences.

Mozambique: Control Without Legitimacy

Mozambique appears stable, but the stability is enforced. After the disputed October 2024 elections, more than 300 people were reportedly killed in post-result unrest.

CRA describes a government increasingly reliant on legal pressure and coercion to contain opposition rather than rebuild legitimacy. In central and northern provinces, grievances are deepened by inequality around gas and mineral projects that generate elite revenue while local communities see limited benefit.

That imbalance feeds the very instability the state is trying to suppress.

Cabo Delgado: A Hybrid Conflict With Commercial Impact

Eight years into the Cabo Delgado insurgency, the conflict has evolved into a mix of extremism, organised crime, and governance failure.

Despite foreign support, the counterinsurgency has struggled. CRA notes that the conflict has added $4.5 billion in extra costs to TotalEnergies’ LNG project in the Rovuma Basin, straining its viability.

Rwandan forces have secured key towns and LNG-linked infrastructure, but rural areas remain contested. More than 6,000 people have been killed since 2017, and nearly one million displaced at various points.

The insurgency has also moved offshore. Attacks near the Cabo Delgado coastline and weak Mozambican naval capacity have increased maritime risk. With South Africa’s Operation Copper scaled back, the Mozambique Channel faces reduced patrol presence, pushing up insurance and freight costs.

Zimbabwe: Collapse With Spillover

CRA depicts Zimbabwe as a state hollowed out by corruption and political control. Hyperinflation remains above 200%, power cuts last up to 12 hours a day, and infrastructure is deteriorating.

The consequences are regional. Thousands cross into South Africa monthly, many without documentation, seeking work and services.

Smuggling has become entrenched. CRA cites estimates that around 70% of cigarettes in circulation are illegal and untaxed, costing South Africa billions in lost revenue.

Trade routes suffer too. Power outages and infrastructure failure in Zimbabwe cause long truck queues at Beitbridge, raising transit times and freight costs along the North-South Corridor.

South Africa: Defence Decline as Economic Risk

South Africa’s 1,038-kilometre northern border is difficult terrain to police, especially with limited resources. CRA describes systemic decline across the SANDF. Aircraft are grounded, naval vessels are confined to port, and army vehicle fleets are deteriorating.

The Navy’s limited patrol time leaves large portions of the Mozambique Channel effectively unguarded for much of the year.

The result is a transnational corridor stretching from the Indian Ocean through Zimbabwe into Limpopo and onward to Gauteng. Arms, narcotics, stolen vehicles, and contraband move along routes that adapt quickly to enforcement pressure.

The Outlook

CRA outlines three paths through 2027:

·         The baseline is continued drift: Mozambique contains but does not defeat the insurgency, Zimbabwe stagnates, South Africa remains constrained, and businesses absorb incremental cost increases.

·         A worsening scenario could follow reduced foreign support in Cabo Delgado or heightened unrest in Zimbabwe, amplifying migration, smuggling, and trade disruption.

·         An improving scenario would require coordinated reform: governance shifts in Mozambique, stabilisation in Zimbabwe, and targeted defence recovery and border modernisation in South Africa.

For now, the dominant trend is clear. Southern Africa’s instability is no longer episodic. It is structural. And as long as that remains true, risk will be priced into every shipment, every investment decision, and every cross-border transaction.

Conclusion

The broader pattern is the emergence of a transnational crime corridor stretching from the Indian Ocean through Zimbabwe into Limpopo and onward to Gauteng. Maritime and land-based networks are increasingly interconnected, making criminal ecosystems more resilient.

For South African businesses, the operating environment now includes more sophisticated targeting, longer exposure during transit, higher compliance friction and reduced external deterrence in high-risk zones. Instability is not episodic. It is structural, and security planning needs to reflect that reality.

~ Source: CRA: Trouble on the Horizon